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Abstract 
 
This research looks at the rhetoric of the Afghan political elite and public in order to see if there 
are differences in attitude toward foreigners between the two groups and also to determine 
whether this attitude has changed over time.  This study concludes that the Afghan public has not 
demonstrated anti-foreign sentiment over the 20th and 21st century while the Afghan political 
elite tend to portray an anti-foreign view through their policies and rhetoric.  Although the 
Afghan public has not been anti-foreign, the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 with the 
assumption that the Afghan public is anti-foreign.  For this reason, it is important to determine if 
this assumption is warranted.  This study exemplifies that the U.S. assumption of Afghans’ anti-
foreign sentiment is not warranted and, for this reason, the United States has made a significant 
fallacy when forming their policies for the country of Afghanistan and its people.   
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 4 
Introduction 
  When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001, it shaped its policies largely on 
the assumption that the Afghan people are anti-foreign.  In this paper, however, one can see that 
the Afghan people have not been anti-foreign and, therefore, it has not been warranted for the 
United States to form policies based on this assumption.  By relying on this assumption, the 
United States has created several problems for both the United States and Afghanistan.  For this 
reason, this study is significant.  By seeing the problems created by relying on this assumption, 
one can see the problem of relying on assumptions in foreign policy.  
While the Afghan public has not demonstrated an anti-foreign attitude, the Afghan 
government has.  By comparing the rhetoric of the Afghan political elite and the Afghan people, 
one can see that it is the Afghan government that bears this anti-foreign sentiment and not the 
Afghan public. The various governments of Afghanistan in modern times have offered many 
clues suggesting their anti-foreign sentiment.  The government’s intolerance of foreigners, 
however, does not accurately reflect the opinion of the public. 
Many argue, however, that is not only the government with these views but also the 
Afghan people. In his book Afghanistan:  A Cultural and Political History, Thomas Barfield lays 
out the debate of when this anti-foreign view was acquired in Afghanistan—a nationalist Afghan 
historian view and a view abstracted from British accounts.1  According to the nationalist Afghan 
historians, there was a response to the British that created an anti-foreign rebellion; however, the 
British accounts say that these Afghan uprisings were not a product of the British invasion, but 
                                                
1 Barfield, Thomas. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010. Print. pg. 122 
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the reason why the British lost the Anglo-Afghan wars.2  Regardless of when this sentiment was 
acquired, both arguments agree on one thing:  the Afghan people have been anti-foreign.  This 
assumption continued to set the tone for Afghanistan’s relationship with outsiders since the 19th 
century—by assuming that Afghans are anti-foreign, foreigners have entered Afghanistan with a 
certain framework shaping their interactions with the Afghan people.  In 2001, this assumption 
helped shape the United States’ framework when interacting with the Afghan people.  Despite 
the reality this assumption was given by allowing it to shape the United States’ framework, this 
assumption is not a reality.  
It has been almost 10 years since the United States entered Afghanistan.  Despite it being 
the longest war in U.S. history, the United States seemed prepared for many possibilities in their 
encounters with the Afghan people.  In Seth Jones’ In the Graveyard of Empires, he states: 
Past empires that have declared to enter Afghanistan—from Alexander the Great to Great 
Britain and the Soviet Union—have found initial entry possible, even easy, only to find 
themselves mired in local resistance. Aware of this history, the United States had the 
resources, manpower, and strategic know-how to create a new order.3  
Because past countries (i.e. the Soviet Union) met local resistance in Afghanistan, the United 
States prepared resources and manpower in order to cope with this anti-foreign resistance; 
however, if this resistance is a reality then why does the United States still struggle in their 
mission despite the abundant resources and manpower?  The United States shaped their policies 
in Afghanistan according to Afghans’ intolerance of outsiders.  Despite the attention this 
sentiment received in their policies, the Afghan people are not anti-foreign.  By looking at 
                                                
2 Barfield, Thomas. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010. Print. pg. 122 
 
3 Jones, Seth G. In the Graveyard of Empires. New York: Norton, 2009. Print. pg. xxv 
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different time periods and sources from the 20th and 21st century, one can see that President 
George W. Bush and his administration were not justified in shaping policy around the Afghan 
people’s supposed resistance of foreigners.  
It is commonly considered that Afghanistan as a nation is anti-foreign.  Despite this 
concurrence, there are many different meanings of anti-foreign.  If anti-foreign signifies ensuring 
that no foreigners rule their country, then Afghanistan can be considered anti-foreign; however, 
if anti-foreign signifies not being welcoming to outsiders, then it is false to consider Afghans 
anti-foreign.  Because of the different interpretations of anti-foreign, this paper looks at different 
sources to show that this group of people is not xenophobic.  The following is a study of 
Afghanistan and its people.   
1. Methodology 
 In this section, I detail the variable I study and the sources I use to study it.  I will also lay 
out the implications of this study and why I chose Afghanistan as the country to study instead of 
another state.  It is also important to understand the organization of this paper in order to 
understand how the argument is presented. With an understanding of the aforementioned aspects, 
the significance of this study is made obvious.    
Afghan sentiment as the variable 
This thesis is a study of Afghan sentiment.  Since the British first invaded Afghanistan in 
1839, Afghanistan has been placed on the world stage.  Because foreign invasions of 
Afghanistan put Afghanistan on the world stage, Afghan anti-foreign sentiment is important.  
Until Afghanistan’s role on the world stage becomes nonexistent, Afghan sentiment will remain 
an important variable.  If the Afghan people are anti-foreign then foreigners will continue to face 
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similar problems in Afghanistan.  Because of this possibility, it makes it obligatory to find out if 
the Afghan people are intolerant of outsiders.  
 I will be looking at two variables in this study – elite rhetoric (my independent variable) 
and public sentiment toward foreigners (my dependent variable).  My hypothesis is that popular 
sentiment does not accurately reflect the rhetoric of the elite classes within the country.  Because 
the situation in Afghanistan prevents me from collecting firsthand accounts, I will be using 
secondary sources for both variables.   
Contrast of the differences in rhetoric between the Afghan political elite and the Afghan 
people will exemplify that the Afghan people have not been anti-foreign.  If going to 
Afghanistan were an option, it would improve this project significantly; however, due to dearth 
of time and funding of this project, research in Afghanistan is not viable.  Because of this, 
utilizing the writings of those who have traveled to Afghanistan will be imperative to this 
argument—a qualitative study.   
Although they disagree when anti-foreign sentiment was adopted in Afghanistan, British 
accounts and Afghan national historians agree that the Afghans are anti-foreign.  If the Afghan 
national historians are correct, intolerance of foreigners can be seen since the Anglo-Afghan 
wars in 1839.  If the British accounts are correct, anti-foreign sentiment in Afghanistan is a 
constant in Afghanistan’s history.  Regardless of the view taken, anti-foreign sentiment would be 
exemplified in the 20th century (because it either came about because of the Anglo-Afghan wars 
or has been a constant).   
Another reason I will rely mostly on 20th century accounts is because of Untied States 
foreign policy.  Since their invasion in 2001, they have used the experiences of other foreigners 
in the 20th century as a guideline.  Because the Soviet Union encountered local resistance in 
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Afghanistan, the United States attempted to account for this possibility.4  By seeing if the 
Afghans are actually anti-foreign during this time, one can see whether United States foreign 
policy assumptions are justified.  
Type of sources 
In order to determine if the Afghan public is anti-foreign, I utilize travel logs and 
memoirs of those who have traveled to Afghanistan.  In these memoirs, travelers (many of whom 
are fluent in Afghan languages) relay their encounters with Afghan natives.  Not only do their 
stories tell us if the Afghan people have been anti-foreign but also possible reasons for this 
sentiment—this is the significance of this type of source.   Despite memoirs and travel logs’ 
essentiality to this project, they do not suffice as adequate research for this project.  
 In order to acquire a comprehensive understanding of this sentiment, other types of 
sources must be utilized.  Looking at United States foreign policy in Afghanistan since 2001, the 
overarching context and significance of this research will be realized.  By studying speeches and 
writings of President George W. Bush’s administration, one can see how anti-foreign sentiment 
has shaped the United States’ foreign policy in Afghanistan since 2001.   American foreign 
policy stresses Afghanistan’s anti-foreign attitude; however, this rhetoric is not valid.  Looking at 
travel logs and memoirs will help refute these claims, but these memoirs only provide us possible 
views of society.   
In addition to memoirs, I will use the speeches and writings of the Afghan political elite.  
By understanding the Afghan government’s rhetoric, one can discern a difference between the 
Afghan government sentiment and that of the public.  Although primary sources are ideal for this 
                                                
4 Jones, Seth G. In the Graveyard of Empires. New York: Norton, 2009. Print. pg. 131 
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paper, the ones that do exist are in Dari and Pashto—Afghan languages I do not speak.  When 
possible, primary sources such as Malalai Joya’s A Woman Among Warlords are used.  It is with 
a variety of sources that the question—if the Afghan people are actually anti-foreign—is 
answered.  
Although this paper will utilize Western sources to understand Western perception of 
Afghanistan, this paper will be Afghan-centric.  An Afghan-centric paper is one that attempts to 
understand Afghan views.  These views include those of government officials and civilians.  This 
distinction between government and the public is essential to this paper.  Although both groups 
represent the country of Afghanistan, their sentiment toward foreigners varies.  Because it varies, 
they must be treated as the distinct groups they are.  In order to treat them as distinct groups, this 
paper can be considered a case study in which I compare views of the Afghan people with that of 
their government.  
Implications 
A potential challenge for this paper is determining exactly what anti-foreign attitudes 
entail for Afghanistan.  In Malalai Joya’s book, her anti-foreign view is palpable; however, it 
may not be so apparent in other writings.  By paying close attention to foreign encounters with 
Afghans, this challenge can be overcome.  This requires understanding exactly what is meant by 
anti-foreign sentiment.  Looking at United States foreign policy in Afghanistan, from 2001 to the 
present, will provide a context in which anti-foreign views will illuminate if existent.  
As stated above, travel to Afghanistan to carry out this study is not an option.  If one were 
to take this study further, research in Afghanistan would be the next necessary step.  Although it 
is an important step, it is not the only step.  For this reason, this study remains significant. By 
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comparing differences in rhetoric between the Afghan political elite and the public, one can see 
if anti-foreign sentiment exists.   
Why Afghanistan 
I chose Afghanistan for this study because it is of such intrinsic importance to the United 
States and the world.  For this reason, it demands attention.  Despite its importance, it remains a 
country for which the world has little understanding.  Except as a base for terrorists, it has not 
received much attention over the last 20 years.  While Afghan sentiment may seem like a minor 
variable, it is one with overwhelming effects if it goes without an accurate understanding.  
Without knowing for certain if the Afghan people are anti-foreign, misperceptions will continue 
to result as a consequence.  
It is also important to note what this study does not try to do.  This is not a study on why 
and when the anti-foreign view came into existence. Below is a literature review on when and 
why this anti-foreign view was adopted.  Many scholars have written on why this sentiment 
exists and when it came about; however, it must first be studied if this view actually has existed 
and continues to exist.  Because of this uncertainty, this study does not attempt to find out when 
this view began.  Only after one can ascertain that this anti-foreign attitude exists can one begin 
to study when it was adopted.  
A Road Map  
 In the next section is the significance for this paper.  It is only with an understanding of 
the significance of this study that this study will be significant.  I have combed through 
secondary sources arguing when and why the anti-foreign view was acquired. In chapter 3 of this 
paper, these sources are presented.  This chapter also outlines travelers’ experiences in the 20th 
and 21st century.  In chapter 4 lie the findings.  This is where American foreign policy rhetoric 
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with that of the Afghan people is compared. While each chapter has its role, the Findings chapter 
is the section in which an anti-foreign can be deducted if present.  Chapter 5 is the conclusion.  
Although it is the final chapter, this study remains incomplete. Because of the United States’ 
continued occupation in Afghanistan, one is not able to conclude permanently that the Afghan 
people are not anti-foreign.  Despite the fact that the lack of an anti-foreign view in Afghanistan 
may be transient, this study remains significant.  
2. Significance 
 This thesis stresses how a trivial assumption can have considerable consequences for 
various actors.  By assuming that the Afghan people are anti-foreign, implications have resulted.  
Studying Afghan sentiment is important for many different actors.  Understanding what it means 
to call the Afghan people anti-foreign shows how this assumption has underlying implications 
for not only the Afghan people but also those who invade the region.  For this reason, this study 
is significant for the United States, which has occupied Afghanistan since 2001.  By 
understanding the significance of this study, one can better understand the consequences of 
making unwarranted assumptions in foreign policy.  
Significance for the Afghan people 
 Although the Afghan public is not anti-foreign, the misperception that they are such has 
significantly affected them.  The United States adopted a light footprint policy in response to the 
Afghans’ so-called history of anti-foreign sentiment.  The United States’ light footprint policy 
will be more completely explained below in chapter 4 (the findings); however, it is important to 
comprehend its implications in order to understand the significance that this study has for the 
Afghan people. 
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By adopting a light footprint policy, the United States has tried to inhibit anti-American 
backlash.  Because of this attempt, the Afghan public has been left without security forces and 
without sufficient international help.  According to a U.S. intelligence in 2009, Taliban forces 
have increased fourfold since 2006.5  Without security forces and with  a light footprint policy, 
the Taliban will continue to grow.   
When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1978 they experienced anti-foreign 
backlash.  Because of the Soviet’s experience with the Afghan people, the United States decided 
to form a policy that they thought would minimize anti-foreign backlash.  Because the Soviet 
Union had a large footprint in Afghanistan, the United States decided for a volte-face:  an 
opposite policy (a light footprint) would be the best means of minimizing an anti-foreign 
backlash.  It is true that the Soviets experienced anti-foreign backlash; however, a large footprint 
policy was not the reason for this backlash.  According to author Lester Grau, the anti-foreign 
backlash was in response to how the Soviet’s large footprint was used, not the large footprint 
itself.6   Despite this backlash, it was an appropriate reaction for Afghans to the Soviet invasion.   
By seeing how assuming that the Afghans are anti-foreign has implications for their 
people, one can understand this study’s value.  The repercussions of the United States’ light 
footprint policy detail the importance assumptions can have for many including the United 
States.   
 
 
                                                
5 "Taliban has grown fourfold." Aljazeera. N.p., 9 Oct. 2009. Web. 7 Mar. 2011. 
<http://english.aljazeera.net/news/americas/2009/10/20091091814483962.html>. 
6 Grau, Lester W. The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan. 
Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1996. Print. 
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Significance for the United States 
By answering whether the Afghan people are anti-foreign, more will be learned about the 
Afghan people in general.  Not only will one have a better understanding of Afghans but also of 
what the possible differences in rhetoric mean for American foreign policy.  In order to have 
success in Afghanistan, the United States must win the hearts of the Afghan people, not just the 
Afghan government.  This is difficult if the rhetoric between the two groups differs drastically. 
Although the point of this research is not to prescribe a policy for the United States, it will show 
that the United States is obliged to decide what rhetoric to hear—that of the Afghan government 
or the public.  
There are many reasons for the United States’ lack of success in Afghanistan; however, 
the assumption that the Afghans are anti-foreign explains part of the reason the United States 
remains in Afghanistan today.   Although U.S. forces cornered Osama bin Laden in his Tora 
Bora hideout in December 2001, they failed to catch him and his organization.  The United 
States blamed this failure on the apprehension of local resistance if he were captured.7  
Therefore, part of the reason for their continued occupation is because of the possibility that 
Afghans will be unwilling to cooperate with outsiders.  It is significant to note that the United 
States’ reason for not capturing Osama bin Laden is because of the possibility that there would 
be anti-foreign backlash.  Because it was a mere possibility, the United States decided not to 
capture Osama bin Laden, which was the United States’ initial reason for invading Afghanistan.  
In the documentary Restrepo, U.S. military troops document their deployment in 
Afghanistan’s Korengal Valley.  This valley is said to be one of the most dangerous places in the 
                                                
7 Kerry, Senator John F. "Tora Bora Revisited: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why." 
111th Congress, 1st session (2009): n. pag. Web. 8 Feb. 2011. 
<http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tora_Bora_Report.pdf>. 
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world.  Because the Taliban is so prevalent in this region, the U.S. soldiers emphasize the 
necessity to have the Afghan people on their side.  Without having the people on their side, the 
United States cannot push forward to get the Taliban.8  Throughout this documentary, the U.S. 
military is seen attempting to secure the Afghan people on their side; however, the accidental 
civilian deaths create resentment toward the troops.  This further increases the significance to get 
the people on their side—as innocents get killed, the Afghan people become more distant from 
siding with the United States.  Because killing civilians does not help the U.S. and Afghanistan 
relationship, the soldiers realize how important it is to ensure as few civilian deaths as possible.   
The aforementioned documentary demonstrates the significance for this study.  While it 
shows the Afghan people resenting some of the American soldiers’ actions (i.e. killing their 
family members and cows), it also shows how the soldiers understand the importance of the 
Afghan people being pro-American.  This documentary, along with other sources, shows the 
Afghan people resenting the U.S. occupation; however, this resentment is warranted.  In this 
documentary, the Afghan locals only resent the United States when the troops kill their family 
members or property.  This does not provide evidence that the Afghan people are anti-foreign; 
however, it does show what the United States needs to do:  respect the Afghan locals in order to 
win the war.  Without Afghan support, the United States will continue to meet the same, 
common problems in their occupation.   
            Foreigners are often to blame for Afghanistan’s suffering.  The devastation gives reason 
for the Afghan people to be anti-foreign, yet this is often not the public’s attitude when they 
encounter outsiders.  As demonstrated during the 19th and 20th century Anglo-Afghan Wars and 
the United States 2001 invasion, the Afghan people resent foreign occupations because of their 
                                                
8 Hetherington, Tim, and Sebastian Junger. Restrepo. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1559549/. 
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familiar outcomes: outsiders continue to invade the country making the residents worse off than 
before their occupation.  They resent those that cause them hard.  Despite their palpable 
resentment, the Afghan people have not been anti-foreign.  The history of Afghanistan gives an 
understanding of why an anti-foreign view might be acquired; however, by comparing the 
rhetoric of Afghan political elite with that of Afghan public and by looking at Afghan encounters 
with foreigners, one can see that the Afghan public has not been anti-foreign over time.    
3. Literature Review 
This chapter details the debate arguing when the anti-foreign view in Afghanistan was 
acquired.  One side of the debate argues that the anti-foreign view in Afghanistan directly 
resulted from the British invasion; however, another side argues that this attitude preceded the 
British invasion.  In this section, one can see the arguments and their evidence.  Looking at this 
debate demonstrates possible reasons why the Afghan people may have been anti-foreign; 
however, this debate does not allow one to conclude that the Afghan people are anti-foreign.   
After a look at the aforementioned debate, the travel logs used for this thesis are 
explained. Although more detail with the travel logs is discussed in the Findings chapter, this 
chapter explains the significance of this type of source, which is to have a better understanding 
of the Afghan people.  Through travel logs, this understanding will come not only by seeing the 
interaction between Afghans and outsiders but also by comparing the rhetoric between the 
Afghan political elite and Afghan public.  By juxtaposing several of Afghanistan’s interactions 
with outsiders, one can discern not only why some argue that the Afghan people are anti-foreign 
but also that their argument is not warranted.   
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3.1 The anti-foreign view: to blame the British or to precede the British? 
Accounts of the Anglo-Afghan Wars provide evidence that the Afghan public resisted the 
British invasion; however, it remains a question whether this resentment is primarily due to the 
British being foreign.  By looking at the debate over when the Afghan public’s anti-foreign 
attitude was acquired, one can see that the British treatment of the Afghans gives reason for the 
Afghans to resent the British.  Despite understanding why the Afghan public may have resented 
the British, others opine that the anti-foreign view preceded the British occupation.  Both sides of 
the debate agree that the Afghan people are anti-foreign, yet they diverge on when this view was 
acquired.  It is possible that this xenophobia was heightened as result of Great Britain, but it is 
also possible that it is the product of Britain’s state-building experience in the country.  
By laying out the arguments, one can see that both views draw on important evidence to 
make their claims; however, this evidence does not suffice for a comprehensive understanding of 
the attitudes in Afghanistan.  Despite this necessity, the arguments of the various schools of 
thoughts are imperative to this topic.  By seeing how the topic has been discussed, what needs to 
be done next is made clearer.  Many scholars agree that the British traumatized the Afghan 
people during their occupation, yet it is disputed whether the supposed anti-foreign view is a 
direct result of this trauma.  
Blame the British            
 Abdur Rahman came to power in Afghanistan in 1880.  “He made defense of Islam and 
jihad a feature of Afghan national identity when dealing with the outside world.”9  It was this 
Islamic character of the Afghan state that unified Afghanistan against outsiders and continues to 
do so in the 20th century.  Abdur Rahman first used Islam to mobilize Afghans against the British 
                                                
9 Barfield, Thomas. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010. Print. page 110 
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in the 1880s; however, his reign is seen throughout the 20th century. By uniting the country, 
Islam ended the Soviet occupation.  Barfield contends, “By framing the [Soviet] conflict as jihad, 
it was possible to unite a large number of people and deprive the Kabul government of 
legitimacy.”10  Although Islam continues to unite Afghans, it is first seen during the Anglo-
Afghan Wars.  Because of this, the British are to blame.  Abdur Rahman was forced to find a 
uniting factor among the Afghan people during the Anglo-Afghan Wars.  This uniting factor at 
the time of the British separated Afghanistan from outsiders, which in turn made the Afghan 
people anti-foreign.  
The British went into Afghanistan with little understanding of the country and its people.  
Some scholars such as B.D. Hopkins, author of The Making of Modern Afghanistan, argue that 
Great Britain’s flawed understandings of Afghanis have affected the formulation of the Afghan 
state.11  Great Britain’s flawed understandings include that the Afghans were violent and 
primitive.7 The conceptualization that Afghans were violent people predicated both Great 
Britain’s actions and expectations when dealing with the Afghan people.12  These conceptions 
play an important role—in fact, they also explain attitudes toward the West.13  Afghanistan is a 
conceptual construct of Britain’s colonial image; thus, the British forced Afghanis into this 
                                                
10 Barfield, Thomas. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010. Print. page 242 
11 Hopkins, B.D. The Making of Modern Afghanistan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988. 
Print. pg. 8, 4 
 
12 Hopkins, B.D. The Making of Modern Afghanistan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988. 
Print. pg 8 
 
13 Hopkins, B.D. The Making of Modern Afghanistan. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1988. 
Print. 
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nation-state through flawed understandings.  These misunderstandings and inaccurate 
representations led to Afghan resentment of foreigners.   
 In his article “Afghan Historiography,” Robert Nichols furthers Hopkin’s argument.  He 
discusses that scholars “re-conceptualized Afghan identity to suit colonial political 
geographies”.14  These flawed understandings explain Afghanistan’s attitude toward the West 
today—by arguing that the Afghan attitude toward the West is a reaction to outside forces, 
Nichols argues that the British created this xenophobic attitude in the country.  The arguments of 
Nichols and Hopkins explain that by not attempting to understand Afghanis through Afghan 
eyes, the British generalized and assumed that Afghanistan was best explained by the British 
perspective and that no other perspective was necessary in dealing with the country:  
 Afghan foreign minister and historian Abdul Samad Ghuas argues, 
[The British invasion angered the Afghanis and created] xenophobic sentiments that 
lingered for many years and proved powerful deterrents to Western style reforms and 
innovations undertaken by Afghan rulers decades later.  The high-handed and aggressive 
attitude of the British had convinced the Afghan population that they would not rest until 
Afghanistan, the last independent Islamic country in Central Asia, was wiped off the 
map.15   
In his aforementioned quote, Afghan foreign minister and historian Abdul Samad Ghuas argues 
that the Afghans feared the British.  As result of this fear, he continues, was Afghan resistance to 
future Western style reforms.  From Great Britain’s approach in Afghanistan, the Afghan people 
concluded that the British wanted to end Afghanistan’s existence. The argument that the British 
created anti-foreign sentiment in Afghanistan demonstrates the significance of unwarranted 
                                                
14 Nichols, Robert. "Afghan Historiography." Wiley (2005): n. pag. Wiley. Web. 20 Nov. 2010. 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1478>. 
 
15 Fitzgerald, Paul, and Elizabeth Gould. Afghanistan's Untold Story. San Francisco: City Lights 
Books, 2009. Print. 
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assumptions in foreign policy.  In addition to the British bearing the consequences of their 
flawed assumption that the Afghans are violent savages (the Afghans resisted the British as 
result), the Afghan people were also affected. Thomas Barfield contends that the British changed 
the role of Islam for Afghanistan and its people.  “Until 1840 religion had played a minor role in 
internal Afghan politics because fighting had always been Muslim on Muslim.”16  When the 
British invaded, Islam was used to mobilize the Afghans in order to protect against non-Muslim 
foreigners, specifically the British.  According to Barfield, this protectionist policy created 
xenophobia and, thus, we can blame the Anglo-Afghan Wars for this view.  Because of the 
myriad ethnic groups, Afghanistan is a diverse region.  During the Anglo-Afghan Wars, unity 
was necessary; however, how was a country with so many differences supposed to unite?  Islam 
was the panacea to this problem.  Through religion, the Afghan government united its people and 
the British were driven back to India. 
The British traumatized the Afghan people, causing the Afghan people to readjust to their 
new reality.  This adjustment was political Islam—the fanaticism and violence that fueled the 
Afghani Muslims to defeat the British.  In “Introduction to Political Islam,” Ana Belén Soage 
says that the British are the reason for the political Islam that emerged in the late 19th century.  
Soage defines political Islam as a means for Muslims to oppose foreigners.17  As Barfield states, 
fighting in Afghanistan had always been Muslim on Muslim.12  When the British invaded, this 
concept changed and Islam became the perfect tool with which to oppose foreigners.  And 
although the First Anglo-Afghan War came to an end, the Afghans did not forget that their 
                                                
16 Barfield, Thomas. Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 2010. Print. 
 
17 Soage, Ana Belén. "Introduction to Political Islam." Wiley (2009): n. pag. Web. 18 Nov. 2010. 
<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1478>. 
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country was invaded without justification.  Soage and other scholars argue that the way Afghans 
show that they have not forgotten this invasion is through the attitudes exemplified through 
xenophobia.   
After the British invaded Afghanistan at the end of the 19th century, Afghan nationalists 
became concerned about the westernization of Afghanistan and the rest of the Islamic world.  
Because of Afghanistan’s experience with the British, westernization was not an option for the 
Afghan people.  Sheikh Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905) was one scholar arguing against 
westernization of Afghanistan: 
The sheikh had concerns that the westernization of the Islamic world was leading to 
moral confusion and believed religion to be necessary in determining behavior 
guaranteeing happiness in this life and the next.  Moreover, he insisted that religion 
should be the underlying basis for the modernization of Muslim societies”.18   
Sheikh Muhammad Abduh’s view was a common concern because of the British occupation in 
Afghanistan.  Not only was it a concern that the westernization of the Islamic world would 
dissipate Islam’s role, but also Afghans began to use Islam to fight foreigners in order to ensure 
this did not happen.  The British attempted westernization of this country, but failed.  Muslims 
were convinced that Great Britain’s failure signified that God favored Muslims and confirmed 
the authenticity of their religion.15  The British created an anti-foreign, pro-Islamic view in 
Afghanistan when their attempt of westernization in Afghanistan failed.  
 In Into the Jaws of Death Lieutenant Colonel Mike Snook further strengthens this 
argument.  Many scholars agree that the Battle of Maiwand (1880) was the first time in 
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Afghanistan that Muslim fanatics were seen.19  Termed the “ghazis,” these warriors were 
unstoppable—the British had a myriad of guns, but the ghazis approached them without fear.  
The ghazis took advantage of the British fear by mass-slaughtering almost the entire British 
military force in the region (all but one British soldier was killed).  “Only moments after the guns 
ceased fire the ghazis came swarming from their cover, chanting prayers, shrieking their battle 
cries and brandishing keen-edged Khyber knives”.20  Lieutenant Colonel Snook attributes these 
fanatical actions strictly to the British invasion; however, is this how Afghanistan dealt with the 
other foreigners?  By seeing Afghan interactions with other outsiders, one can see that despite 
the blatant resentment Lieutenant Colonel Snook notes, the Afghan public has not been anti-
foreign over time.   
When the British assassinated Afghan emperor Habibollah Kha in 1919, the Afghan 
public acquired more anti-British sentiment.  This led to a new group known as “The Young 
Afghans,” which called for Afghanistan to defeat the British in the name of Islam.   Afghan 
nationalist historians say that this pro-Islamic mobilization was a reaction to the British invasion 
and cannot be found elsewhere in history.  Others consider that this sentiment is due to 
Afghanistan’s violent past that preceded the Anglo-Afghan wars.  Although the mobilization of 
several fundamentalist Islamic groups came after the Anglo-Afghan Wars, it may be that this 
fundamentalism in which pro-Islam and anti-foreign views result was just presented in a 
different way than before the British invasion.  
At the end of the 19th century, Mahmud-i-Tarzi became a key figure in the history of 
Afghanistan partially because of his Sirajul Akhbar, an anti-colonial newspaper that was said to 
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not only represent the anti-foreign views held in Afghan but also to help mobilize the Afghan 
people against foreigners, specifically the British.  “These [writings] were the earliest stirrings of 
a global Islamic movement—against imperialism and strongly anti-British.”21  By utilizing the 
19th and early 20th century interactions between the British and Afghan public, the 
aforementioned scholars argue that Afghanistan’s anti-foreign attitude, represented by Mahmud-
i-Tarzi’s newspaper, is a reaction to the British invasion.  The British placed the Afghan people 
in misery, which led the Afghan people to resent the British and other foreigners.  Despite the 
aforementioned evidence, some argue that Afghanistan’s history prior to the British invasion 
shows that the British are not to blame for Afghanistan’s xenophobia.22   
An attitude that precedes the British 
The 1880 Battle of Maiwand ended with a loss for the British.  Great Britain’s plentiful 
and superior weapons could not withstand Afghanistan’s determination to end the British 
occupation.  British accounts of this event describe the Afghans as crazed and brutal.23  Although 
this battle demonstrates the Afghan people’s passionate resentment of the British, some scholars 
argue that this behavior is nothing new.  The 1908 Imperial Gazetteer of India summed up views 
of Afghans by saying:  
Their step is full of resolution, their bearing proud and apt to be rough.  Inured to 
bloodshed from childhood they are familiar with death, audacious in attack, but easily 
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discouraged by failure.  They are treacherous and passionate in revenge . . . They are 
much under the influence of their Mullas, especially for evil.”24   
Although the previous quote was written after the British invaded Afghanistan, it argues that the 
Afghan people have a long history of being violent and anti-foreign.  This report supports that 
the Afghan uprisings against foreigners are not a product of the British invasion, but a view that 
preceded the Anglo-Afghan Wars—Afghanistan’s attitude toward foreigners is endogenous and 
was a part of their culture before the British invaded.  In “Salafist and Wahhabist Influence in 
Afghanistan”, authors Noah Tucker and Sue Sypko detail how political Islam has been used: 
“The majority of uprisings waged in the name of Islam were in reaction to either invasion or 
westernizing reforms.”25  This article contends that Afghan leaders have appealed to Islam to 
rally support for a particular cause since as early as the 11th century.21  While Islam mobilized 
the public during the British invasion, Afghans’ use of Islam to gain support and fight off 
outsiders was nothing new.   
              Although there are no specific accounts of violence in his book, Meredith Runion 
discusses each group that invaded Afghanistan—most of them failing to conquer.  Invaders came 
and went, but Afghanis became accustomed to their entrance. In 700 B.C.E., the Medes Empire 
invaded Afghanistan. This marks the first of many empires that entered Afghanistan.  Following 
the Medes was the rise of the Persian Empire and then the rule of the Macedonians. Eventually 
Alexander the Great came to the region.  The country was greatly divided at this time, some 
regions much more peaceful than others.  “The [northern] region prospered but was not nearly as 
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peaceful as the southern region.”26  Afghans are xenophobic because of the myriad of forced 
invasions into Afghanistan.  It is not the British invasion that accounts for this; it is the 
accumulation of incursions and the consequences that followed and led to Afghanistan’s anti-
foreign attitude.   
                In A.D. 642, the Mongols began the Arab conquest by coming to Afghanistan.  The 
Mongols divided Afghanistan and forced Islam on the people.  Several scholars have said that it 
is this time in history that explains Afghanistan’s present—Great Britain’s invasion is simply 
evidence supporting the Mongolian invasion as cause for Afghanistan’s anti-foreign attitude.  
Since the beginning of time, Afghanistan’s relation with foreigners has been in the form of 
invasion (state-building being a form of invasion).  “Genghis Khan is widely known for the 
destruction he brought to many countries.  In Afghanistan, he is remembered as a detrimental 
and genocidal ruler who ransacked and pillaged the land.”27  According to Runion, Genghis 
Khan (the Mongol leader) is the reason for the problems in Afghanistan today—looking at 
Afghanistan’s interactions with foreigners will provide an understanding of Afghanistan’s 
xenophobia.22   
            Although the British realize that their occupation destabilized the country, most British 
accounts unsurprisingly affirm that they are not the reason for Afghan sentiment toward the 
West.  This view also argues that it is not Afghanistan’s encounters with invaders that created 
xenophobia of foreigners, but it was their roots in tribal society that account for the country’s 
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current political complexities.28  Several scholars consider that Afghanistan presents the same 
problems as it did 2,500 years ago.29  These problems include their attitudes toward foreigners.  
          Mountstuart Elphinstone led the first British mission to Afghanistan in the early 1800s.  
He noticed the fragmented nature of Afghanistan and called for a united government.  He told a 
tribal leader his opinion and the leader responded, “We are content with discord, we are content 
with alarms, we are content with blood.  But we will never be content with a master.”30  This 
quote supports a preceding anti-foreign attitude of the British.  The majority of foreign states that 
have come into Afghanistan have played the role of a conqueror by trying to take over their land.  
And because the Afghani people resist conquerors, Afghanis resist foreigners.   Primary sources 
such as Mountstuart’s encounter with a tribal leader provide insight into this argument:  while 
some say these encounters demonstrate Afghanistan’s anti-foreign attitude, one can only 
conclude that they resent foreign rule of their country.  
            Mohammed Ali, author of A Cultural History of Afghanistan and a scholar of Afghani 
people, argues that Islam unified Afghanistan.31  The diverse tribes, for the first time, were 
linked together by a common faith.  This cohesion led to the concept of holy wars in which Islam 
was used to oppose outsiders.  This unification came with the introduction of Islam in the 7th 
century A.D.; however this does not mean that the anti-foreign view came in the 7th century A.D. 
with the introduction of Islam?  It is argued that Afghanistan used a pro-Islamic attitude to 
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express their anti-foreign view.  Despite this argument, one cannot conclude that the use of Islam 
to oppose outsiders entails that the Afghan people are anti-foreign.  
          Although the nation may have been unified through Islam, it is not certain if this 
unification is the cause of the views they hold today.  This leads one to ask:  does the pro-Islamic 
attitude precede or occur simultaneously with the anti-foreign attitude held in Afghanistan?   
This may present a problem in this study, but by looking at the schools of thought it seems as if 
there is one thing that both groups agree on:  Islam was used to fuel the anti-foreign view and in 
turn, a pro-Islamic attitude was amplified because of xenophobia.   
          The Afghan people resented the British occupation of their country.  This resentment is 
demonstrated through military action between the Afghan public and British (such as the Battle 
of Maiwand).  Their actions reflect their attitude toward the British: during battles and 
discussions with the British, Afghans made it clear that they would not tolerate a British rule.  
Despite making this known, the British traumatized the Afghan people.  Killing civilians and 
attempting to change their so-called “primitive” way of life, the British outstayed their welcome 
in Afghanistan.  While some argue that the British are to blame for the anti-foreign view in 
Afghanistan, others argue that this attitude preceded the British invasion.  Although historical 
accounts demonstrate that the Afghan public resisted the British, it cannot be concluded from 
these accounts that the Afghan people are anti-foreign.  Because it cannot be concluded that the 
Afghan people are anti-foreign simply because they resented the British, other interactions 
between Afghans and foreigners must be looked at. 
3.2    20th Century Afghanistan: When foreigners meet 
         Afghanistan has been a quixotic tourist destination for the last century.  Despite not being a 
popular vacation destination, travel logs about Afghanistan are prevalent.  In these travel logs, 
 27 
the authors describe every aspect of their experience.  Through their stories, the reader learns an 
outsider’s perception of the Afghan people and the Afghan people’s perception of the outsider.  
This is important because there are contrasts in Western and Afghan perception.  Although many 
outsiders perceive Afghans as anti-foreign, many travel logs demonstrate that this is not the case.  
In addition, it is important to see what foreigners think an anti-foreign attitude entails.  By seeing 
interactions between the Afghan public and outsiders, these questions are answered.  Each travel 
log provides new insight, yet there are several similarities throughout each of them.  Many of 
these travelers notice that there is an obvious distrust of foreigners, yet they simultaneously find 
hospitality and kindness throughout their travels.  Despite many visitors noticing that the Afghan 
people are suspicious of foreigners, many of these travelers learn that this distrust is a result of 
the Afghan government.  It is for this reason that the significance of travel logs to this study is 
again realized:  one learns not only of the Afghan public’s perception of foreigners, but also that 
of the Afghan government.   
            One of the most recognized of these travel logs is The Road to Oxiana by Robert 
Byron.32   In his 1933 memoir, he recounts his journey through Afghanistan.  Most people 
remember his great descriptions of Afghan architecture, but his writings also give important 
descriptions of the people and his interactions with them.  Although only thirty pages are devoted 
to his travel in Afghanistan, much is to be learned of the Afghan people and foreigners’ 
perceptions of Afghanistan.  For example, one learns that Byron’s definition of anti-foreign is 
not warranted—he is disgusted that Afghans expect him to conform to their laws, arguing that a 
guest should not have to conform to a host country’s rules.28  From Byron’s experience with 
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Afghan laws, it cannot be concluded that the Afghan people are anti-foreign.  This exemplifies 
the significance of Western perception:  one’s definition of anti-foreign may not actually signify 
true xenophobia.   
         Another important memoir is Eric Newby’s A Short Walk through the Hindu Kush 
(1956).33  Through Newby’s conversations with Afghans, the reader not only learns about the 
public but also how their government’s policies reflect the government’s anti-foreign attitude 
during this time.  Despite the fact that they were written during different time periods, there are 
many parallels with his book, Debra Denker’s Sisters Under the Bridge of Fire, and Rory 
Stewart’s The Places In Between.34 35  In all three memoirs, the reader is able to contrast the 
Afghan people’s sentiment and the political elite.  This contrast is shown in conversations with 
the Afghan public.  This is important because these conversations explain the policies and also 
Afghan public perception of these policies.  In all three works, the authors note how government 
attitudes of foreigners are expressed through the Afghan public.   
           In Sisters Under the Bridge of Fire, Debra Denker records her experiences in Afghanistan 
during the Soviet Union invasion.  There is much overlap with Denker and Newby’s book.  They 
note similar descriptions of the Afghan people and stress the differences between the political 
elite rhetoric and that of the public.   Her story is extraordinary because not only is she a 
foreigner but also a woman.  If the Afghans were anti-foreign they would be even less tolerant of 
foreign women because of their relationships with Afghan women (i.e. women are not allowed to 
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sleep in the same room as men).  Despite their strict regulations on the Afghan women, the 
Afghan men defy their tradition when dealing with Denker.  She is taken into their homes and is 
allowed privileges the typical Afghan woman was not.  One of these privileges is the ability to 
sleep in the same room as men.  This is not typically allowed for women, yet for this foreigner 
they not only allowed but also invited this act.    
          Her memoir demonstrates how significant the travel log genre is to this topic:  differences 
in rhetoric between the political elite and public can be found simply by interacting with the 
Afghan people themselves.  Although simply by looking at these interactions shows these 
differences, it also remains important to look at Afghan political elite sources in order to see if, at 
times, the Afghan government has not accurately represented the Afghan public’s view of 
outsiders.  This is very significant for the United States foreign policy in Afghanistan.  As 
rhetoric and attitudes differ between the Afghan political elite and public, the United States 
government must decide which view to pay heed. 
            Another well-known travel book is Rory Stewart’s The Places in Between.  A New York 
Times review states that Stewart survived his 2002 journey through Afghanistan because of the 
kindness of strangers.36   When the United States invaded Afghanistan in 2001 they formed their 
policy on the assumption that the Afghan public is anti-foreign and, thus, will resent the United 
States occupation.  Because of this, Stewart’s travel log is essential to this paper.  He comes to 
Afghanistan after the U.S. invasion, yet receives only the Afghan public’s kindness and 
hospitality.  Almost everyone Rory Stewart met treated him as a guest of honor—showing that 
the Afghan public is not anti-foreign during this time.   
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          Stewart's approach is also worth noting. The reader learns little about the author—it is an 
Afghan-centric book in which Stewart attempts not only to immerse himself into their culture but 
also to eliminate his bias.  Although it is impossible to eliminate a bias completely, he is 
successful at providing a well-rounded account of the Afghan people—showing not only 
possible anti-foreign sentiment but also tolerance of foreigners.  
        Although the Findings chapter contains more details of the travel logs, it is important to 
summarize the approaches of several in order to understand how an anti-foreign sentiment could 
be deducted from their readings.  By looking at the next chapter, one can determine that the 
Afghanistan’s people have not been anti-foreign by seeing differences in rhetoric between the 
Afghan political elite and the public. 
4. Findings 
         In this chapter, one can find certain flaws of the aforementioned argument of when 
Afghanistan acquired an anti-foreign attitude.  By seeing these flaws, it is made obvious that the 
question of if the Afghan people are anti-foreign remains inconclusive by simply looking at their 
debate.  The next section of this chapter gives American accounts of the Afghan resistance in the 
country.  Throughout the United States foreign policy are assumptions that the Afghan people 
are anti-foreign.  It is important to understand first what the United States government means by 
anti-foreign sentiment.  After having an understanding of what anti-foreign views entail, I will 
utilize travel memoirs and other sources from the 20th and 21st century to show that the Afghan 
people are not anti-foreign despite several claims.   
4.1 Flaws of the Afghan historians and British accounts        
         The literature on this subject not only lays out the schools of thought and their arguments 
but it also lays out the flaws of their arguments.  The flaw of many studies that are consistent 
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with the nationalist Afghan historian view (that the British created the anti-foreign attitude in 
Afghanistan) is that their historical analysis is either not sufficient or is nonexistent.  It is not 
possible to argue that the British instilled an anti-foreign sentiment in Afghans without looking at 
the history that preceded the Anglo-Afghan invasions.  
            The flaw of the argument consistent with British accounts (British accounts state that the 
xenophobia is not a result of the British invasion) is that they do not attempt to see if the anti-
foreign, pro-Islamic view was heightened because of the British incursion.   This group believes 
that this xenophobia was already present in the country; however, it does not see if the attitudes 
were heightened as a result.  There were three Anglo-Afghan Wars: The first (1839-1842), the 
second (1878-1880), and the third (1919)—each of which should be looked at in order to see if 
the anti-foreign view grew in response.  
 Although this thesis does not devote itself entirely to the study of the aforementioned 
flaws, it is significant to note that the above studies remain incomplete as long as their problems 
go unaddressed.  By looking at the United States policy in Afghanistan from 2001 to present, one 
can see how the debate over when and why an anti-foreign view was acquired in Afghanistan 
plays a role in shaping the strategies of the United States in Afghanistan.  
 4. 2 U.S. Foreign Policy from 2001 to present 
 In this section, significant aspects of United States policy in Afghanistan from 2001 to 
present are detailed.  Although this section is devoted to U.S. policy in Afghanistan, only what is 
relevant to this topic is discussed.  This topic is important for two reasons.  The first reason is 
that through the United States’ policies and speeches, one can see that the United States has 
shaped its experience in response to anti-foreign attitudes held in Afghanistan.  U.S. policy has 
depended on the assumption that the Afghans are anti-foreign, yet the Afghans continue not to 
 32 
demonstrate an anti-foreign attitude.  Because of this assumption, this study is significant.  The 
Afghan public has come to resent the United States occupation because of many of the United 
States policies.  This is the second reason discussion of U.S. policy in Afghanistan is important.  
The Afghans’ resentment of the U.S. occupation does not signify an anti-foreign view.  The 
Afghan public has not been hostile to foreigners, but demonstrates resistance in response to the 
suffering the U.S. continues to cause Afghanistan.   
It is understandable that some aspects of foreign policy may have to be based on 
assumptions; however, it is not surprising that there are implications from many assumptions that 
turn out unwarranted.  For this reason, it has been a disadvantage for the United States to assume 
that the Afghan people are anti-foreign.  For example, part of the reason the United States failed 
to capture Osama bin Laden in December 2001 was because the United States assumed there 
would be an anti-American response from the Afghan people.37  In this section, one can see the 
United States’ role in Afghanistan since 2001 and the implications of the United States 
assumptions.   
The early days 
  On September 11th, 2001, Al Qaeda members murdered more than 3,000 victims when 
they hijacked and crashed planes into the World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and a field in 
Pennsylvania.  It took two months after this event for the United States to topple Afghanistan’s 
Taliban regime. The United States mission was not complete, though, until Al Qaeda and its 
leaders were captured.   
                                                
37 Kerry, Senator John F. "Tora Bora Revisted: How We Failed to Get Bin Laden and Why." 
111th Congress, 1st session (2009): n. pag. Web. 8 Feb. 2011. 
<http://foreign.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Tora_Bora_Report.pdf>. 
 
 33 
The U.S. war in Afghanistan is constantly referred to as the other war—the Iraq war 
receives more attention from the media and the U.S. government.  The mission in Afghanistan 
was simple for former President George W. Bush: combat and punish Al Qaida.  Although there 
were different views on how to stabilize the country, most of the Bush administration agreed that 
nation building was not the reason for the United States’ presence.  With the collective help of 
other countries, the United States remains determined to punish Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders 
and their followers.  By not adopting nation-building policies, the Bush administration 
established a light footprint policy—a policy opposite of the one the Soviets adopted in the 
1980s.  The Soviet policy in Afghanistan was heavy-handed and aggressive.  Because of the 
Afghan people’s reaction to this heavy-handed Soviet policy, the United States argues that a light 
footprint policy is the best alternative for Afghanistan.   
Despite their determination to punish Al Qaeda, the United States is losing international 
and Afghan support.  Without the Afghan people’s endorsement, problems have and will 
continue to ensue.  Because the United States continues to divert attention and resources to the 
Iraq war, New York Times reporter David S. Rohde argues, there is an increase in Afghan and 
Pakistan resentment.38  This Afghan resentment may explain the United States’ continued lack of 
success.  It is a cycle: without progress, Afghans resent the United States occupation, and this 
resentment causes further lack of progress.  This shows that Afghan resentment is within 
reason—the United States continue to make promises that go unfulfilled and the Afghan people 
are justly responding to these failures.  Despite this resentment, it cannot be argued that the 
Afghans are anti-foreign.  They react to situations as appropriate: this is not anti-foreign 
sentiment in and of itself.  It is a reaction to a situation that happens to involve a foreign group. 
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 In Seth Jones’ In the Graveyard of Empires, he frequently refers to the U.S. goal of 
capturing al Qaeda leaders while simultaneously ensuring a light footprint in the region.39  One 
of the main reasons for their light footprint policy was because of the Soviet experience in 
Afghanistan:   
They wanted to prevent large-scale popular resistance similar to what the Soviet 
Union had encountered in the 1980s; they did not want the U.S. military engaged 
in peacekeeping or nation-building operations; and they ultimately believed that 
small numbers of ground troops and airpower, working with Afghan forces, 
would be sufficient to establish security.40  
The aforementioned reason (Afghan civilian resistance) for a light footprint is not a valid one 
because the Afghan people are not anti-foreign.  Despite this uncertainty, the mere concern over 
possible Afghan resistance was the reason for the United States’ overarching light footprint 
policies and their outcomes in Afghanistan.  Centcom commander General John Abizaid, a 
scholar of Afghanistan, said that the overriding reason for the light footprint policy was to 
preclude or minimize local opposition.41  This shows the extent to which Afghanistan’s supposed 
anti-foreign attitude played a role in U.S. foreign policy.  This attitude was such a bona fide 
worry to the United States that the United States allowed it to determine the nature of their 
policy.   
In his article, Charles Krauthammer argues that that while assuming the Afghans are anti-
foreign is a reasonable postulation, it proved wrong:  “Not just because the enemy proved highly 
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resilient but because the allegiance of the population turned out to hinge far less on resentment of 
foreign intrusiveness than on public insecurity, which made them side with the insurgents out of 
sheer fear.”40  Despite Krauthammer’s argument, the United States assumption was not 
reasonable.  It was not the heavy aspect of the Soviet’s policy that accounts for Afghan 
resistance, but it was how this footprint was used.  One way a heavy footprint could be used to 
the United States’ benefit is population protection, which entails state building and requires more 
troops.  This demonstrates that it is not the scale of the footprint but how this footprint is used.  
The Afghan public resisted how the Soviet Union used their heavy occupation, but this alone 
does not allow the United States to conclude that a light footprint policy is their only option.   
Much is to be learned by the United States when studying the Soviet Union invasion of 
Afghanistan in the 1980s.  Because of this, it is within reason for the United States to refer to the 
Soviets’ experience when forming policy for their 2001 invasion of Afghanistan.  By doing this, 
however, the United States relied too heavily on the Soviet Union’s experience.  It is true that 
there was resentment of the Soviets and it is also true that the Soviets had a large presence in the 
region, though this resentment was not in response to the Soviets’ large footprint policies.  The 
Afghan public resisted the Soviet Union because of their treatment of the public.  The Soviets 
did not try to gain support from the Afghan public and the public resisted the Soviets in 
response.42  Because of this, the United States reason to adopt a light footprint policy is 
unwarranted.  
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December 2001 
Two important events happened in Afghanistan in December 2001:  the signing of the 
Bonn Agreement and the mission at Tora Bora.  The Bonn Agreement was created in order to re-
establish government institutions for Afghanistan.  In this agreement, an interim authority was 
established in which government duties would be fulfilled until Afghanistan’s presidential 
elections.43 The interim government’s functions include dealing with the affairs of the state, 
regulating of currency, human rights monitoring, and abiding by international standards.44  This 
agreement established Hamid Karzai as the head of the thirty-member administration.45  The 
agreement was essential to Afghanistan’s transition—it demanded the establishment of security 
forces along with equal representation of all Afghan ethnicities.  The Bonn Agreement is 
significant because its promises have gone unfulfilled.  Because of this, many Afghan people 
demonstrate resentment.42  
The Bonn Agreement also established the peacekeeping role of the international 
community.  This is significant because, while it established this role, the international 
community did not follow through with their responsibilities.  Although the Bonn Agreement 
states otherwise, the United States stressed that peacekeeping should be minimal (some speeches 
indicate that it should only be in the city of Kabul).  The Afghans noticed the United States’ 
failed promises.  UN Secretary General Kofi Annan said, “this has led to increasingly vocal 
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demands by ordinary Afghans.”47   Despite the United States’ concern that resistance would 
result from a large presence, their small presence policies created problems for the Afghan 
people.  This stresses the United States policy in Afghanistan—a light footprint in which Al 
Qaeda may be tackled, but security and peace issues are not.  
Another important aspect of the Bonn Agreement was the establishment of a 
constitutional Loya Jirga.  A Loya Jirga is a typical meeting held in Afghanistan when the 
country faces important reform.26  The Loya Jirga, which was held between June 12 and June 19, 
2002, was in charge of drafting a constitution; however, Malalai Joya (a member of 
Afghanistan’s parliament) says it had already been drafted behind the scenes.  “As delegates, 
many of us felt we were being sued to legitimize a document that we were not able to 
influence.”26  If the constitution had already been drafted, what was the purpose of the Loya 
Jirga?  Malalai Joya says that its purpose was in order to be perceived as a democracy. 
 Another issue with the Loya Jirga dealt with propositions.  In order even to propose an 
amendment, at least fifty delegates had to agree.26  The Loya Jigra’s sole purpose was to reform 
the country; by setting hurdles such as the aforementioned one, it made reform less likely.  As 
President George W. Bush said in his April 17, 2002 address, peace will be achieved in 
Afghanistan by helping the country build a stable government.48  In order to achieve this stable 
government, many hurdles must first be dismantled.  The purpose of the Bonn Agreement was 
created to recreate the state of Afghanistan.  Despite its purpose, the United States government 
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constantly said that their purpose was not state building.  Sending these mixed messages, the 
Afghan people continue to show more resentment toward the United States.  This resentment, 
however, comes with some justification:  the United States has made Afghanistan suffer and the 
Afghan people respond to this suffering.  Although they show resentment, the Afghan people are 
not anti-foreign.  Many resent the United States occupation, but this does not reflect on their 
attitude toward foreigners.   
 The second event in December 2001 occurred in the mountains of Tora Bora in eastern 
Afghanistan.  This event is an important reflection of the United States using the mere possibility 
of Afghan resentment to justify their actions or in this case, their lack of action.  The United 
States’ initial and central reason for being in Afghanistan was to capture Osama bin Laden and 
his followers; however, at Tora Bora, the threat of Afghan resentment as part of the reason for 
their failure to capture him.  
 In November 2009, Senator John F. Kerry addressed the Senate with his Tora Bora 
Revisited.  In this report, he discusses the 2001 failed military engagement at Tora Bora.  This 
eastern Afghanistan region is well-known as Osama bin Laden’s hideout and the United States’ 
failure to capture him at this location.  In December of 2001, American and Afghan forces 
surrounded Tora Bora.  The U.S. government was certain that Osama bin Laden was present at 
Tora Bora; however, despite this certainty, they still failed to capture him.   
 In this article, Senator Kerry says that it was Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s 
decision not to deploy American forces. “Rumsfeld said at the time that he was concerned that too 
many U.S. troops in Afghanistan would create an anti-American backlash and fuel a widespread 
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insurgency.”49  The assumption that the Afghan people are anti-foreign was one of the main 
reasons Osama bin Laden was not captured in December 2001.  This assumption is not warranted, 
yet remained a real threat to the United States as it deterred the U.S. troops from completing their 
mission.  The Bush administration said from the onset that they had the goal of catching Osama bin 
Laden and his followers.  By not deploying more troops, the Bush administration went against their 
mission.  
 Many politicians, such as former Vice President Dick Cheney, defended Rumsfeld’s decision 
because they said they were uncertain of Osama bin Laden’s exact location; however, the majority 
of sources were certain that Tora Bora was Osama bin Laden’s location.50  Many sources (i.e. the 
Pentagon and CIA operatives) state that the Bush administration’s focus on the Iraq war was part of 
the reason Osama bin Laden was not captured in December 2001.  During this time, President 
George W. Bush’s attention had already begun to shift.  “From day one it was Iraq, Iraq, Iraq,” 
remarked Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage.51  Because of this, many argue, Osama bin 
Laden was not captured at Tora Bora and was able to escape to Pakistan, where many think he 
remains today.    
    Although Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage and many others argue that it was the 
Bush administration’s focus on Iraq that led to Osama bin Laden’s escape, Secretary of Defense 
Ronald Rumsfeld said that it was because too many U.S. troops in the region would create an anti-
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American backlash.52  It remains a question whether he was using the possibility of anti-foreign 
backlash to justify his lack of action at Tora Bora or if that was truly the reason for Osama bin 
Laden’s escape.  It is precarious that Rumsfeld’s worry about anti-foreign backlash was the real 
reason for his lack of action because, at this time, the Bush administration’s attention had fully 
turned to Iraq.   
 In addition to the overarching focus on Iraq, the reliance on Afghan forces also led to Osama 
bin Laden’s escape.  Because the local Afghan troops would not suffice to fight Al Qaeda at Tora 
Bora, the CIA requested additional U.S. troops.53  This request went unanswered and the U.S. 
mission at Tora Bora was forced to rely almost completely on local Afghan troops.  This led to 
Osama bin Laden’s escape to Pakistan.  It remains a question why the CIA’s request for more 
troops went unanswered:  was it because more troops would lead to anti-American backlash or was 
it because these resources were being allotted for Iraq?  Although the answer to this question 
remains unknown, the Bush administration used anti-foreign backlash to justify their actions in 
Afghanistan.  
Partially due to the failure at Tora Bora, the United States remains in Afghanistan today.  
Despite their continued presence and promises to increase aid, the war in Afghanistan remains 
lightly funded relative to other wars.  For example, by 2010 cumulative spending on Iraq reached 
$751 billion while Afghanistan had received $336 billion.54   Although it is not certain that more 
funding would ameliorate the rebuilding of Afghanistan, it is certain that the administration’s 
inadequate funding policies have not been successful thus far.  One can measure their lack of 
success simply by looking at the amount of corruption and lack of freedom that are ever-
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increasing in the country.  The Afghan public resents the United States occupation as result of 
these problems. 
The warlords and their return to power 
 The United States strategy of combating Al Qaeda is also worth noting.  Many warlords 
have returned to power because the United States continues to fund them in order to capture Al 
Qaeda members.  These warlords are largely responsible for Afghanistan’s devastation in the 
1990s.55  In the 1990s, Hekmatyar was known for being “the most brutal of a generally brutal 
group” and in 1994 he bombed Kabul destroying half the city and killing 25,000 people.56  
Today, Hekmatyar has a position in the Afghanistan parliament.  Despite their history of 
violence, many warlords have important roles in the rebuilding of Afghanistan.  According to a 
Human Rights Watch report, these warlords make up 60 percent of the new parliament.57  This 
further questions the United States’ purpose in Afghanistan.  Although rhetoric says that the 
United States is in Afghanistan to help build a stable government, they are allowing the 
promotion of notorious warlords.  In Kathy Gannon’s 2004 “Afghanistan Unbound”, she 
discusses how the international community has abandoned Afghans by promoting these 
warlords.58  Not only has the international community abandoned these Afghans by allowing the 
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promotion of these warlords but it has also endorsed these warlords by allowing their promotion.  
With warlords in power, Afghanistan’s ability to reform is inhibited.  
 In Time’s “The Warlords of Afghanistan” Aryn Baker interviews Maghferat Samimi, an 
Afghan civilian.  Samimi says that the problem is that the warlords are not only continuing to 
commit the same crimes they did in the 1990s but the United States government now also 
protects them.59  “[The warlords not being held accountable for their crimes and also being 
granted government positions has] fueled public discontent with the U.S.-backed Afghan 
government.”57 The warlords caused much harm for the Afghan people and the United States has 
allowed and even promoted their come to power.  Because of this, Afghans resent the United 
States occupation and this seems like an appropriate reaction.  Despite this being a justified 
reaction, one cannot conclude that the Afghans are anti-foreign because of this.  This reaction 
does not signify intolerance of foreigners, but an intolerance of those who allow Afghanistan’s 
enemies to come to power.   
The author of In the Graveyard of Empires, Seth Jones, says that one of the many 
repercussions of the United States’ lack of funding is the return of Afghanistan’s most infamous 
warlords.  Due to the dearth of foreign aid, the United States military has recruited local-warlord 
militia forces.60  Lieutenant General John R. Vines stated that local warlords “led every mounted 
patrol and most operations because they knew the ground better and could more easily spot 
something that was out of place.”61  Though it is most likely true that Afghanistan’s warlords 
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know the terrain better than American forces, the Afghan public does not support their 
government positions, yet these warlords are still permitted to represent the Afghan people in 
government and war.62  How is this being allowed?  These warlords devastated the current 
generation in Afghanistan, but are still being given revered spots in government.  Their policies 
in the 1990s regressed Afghanistan and its economy, yet today they are still in charge of 
Afghanistan’s economic and political progress.   
In 2004, Hamid Karzai became president of Afghanistan. “President Karzai has praised 
the mujahideen as heroes for their part in the war against the Soviets in the 1980s.  But that is not 
how ordinary Afghans view them.”60  On many issues, the locals do not see eye to eye with their 
president.  Because of this and his relationship with several warlords, many Afghans question 
President Hamid Karzai’s intentions for their country.  The United States’ intentions in 
Afghanistan are also questioned because many believe Karzai is a “puppet” for the United 
States.63   Many individuals criticize President Karzai and his weakness.  Malalai Joya was first 
elected to the interim authority and then as a member of Parliament. Many refer to her as the 
bravest woman in Afghanistan because of her condemnation of United States foreign policy and 
the resultant lack of reform in her country.53  In her book A Woman Among Warlords, she 
describes President Karzai as a “puppet ruler of the United States.”64  She also mentions 
repeatedly that it is the White House’s requests to which Karzai responds, despite his obligation 
to respond to those of the Afghan people.53  For this reason, many refer to Karzai as a puppet 
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ruler of the United States.  Although President Karzai knows the warlords’ backgrounds, he has 
yet to punish or expel them from parliament. This is where frustration lies:  these people should 
not be able to represent the population and they should also be prosecuted for their actions.   
 Kathy Gannon, an Edward R. Murrow Press Fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations.  
Gannon says, “Although President Hamid Karzai is strong on paper, he is weak in fact. The drug 
trade is surging, the Taliban are creeping back, and real power rests in the hands of the country’s 
many warlords.”65  It seems as if the United States’ foreign policy has yet to address these 
concerns with President Karzai.  This again questions the United States’ purpose in Afghanistan. 
With the sole goal of finding Al Qaeda, they are simultaneously promoting a safe haven for Al 
Qaeda and Taliban members by allowing warlords with similar views as the Taliban to rule the 
country.  
 According to the Afghanistan National Security Council’s National Threat Assessment of 
Afghanistan to the United States: these warlords were the “principle obstacle to the expansion of 
the rule of law into the provinces and thus the achievement of the social and economic goals that 
the people of Afghanistan expect their Government, supported by the International Community, 
to deliver.”66  Because of the warlords’ presence in the government and a lack of security forces, 
the Bonn agreement failed to live up to its expectations.  What has not failed to live up to its 
expectations was the United States’ attempt to have a minimal peacekeeping role in the region.  
By looking at the United States’ light footprint policy, one can see how minimal the United 
States’ peacekeeping role remains.  
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The United States’ light footprint policies and their repercussions  
As author Seth Jones states, the small footprint policy was based on the past—the heavy 
presence of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan led to a large-scale popular resistance.67  Because of 
this, a small presence was the logical alternative for the United States; however, many argue that 
it was not the Soviet’s large presence that led to Afghan resistance, but how they threatened the 
population instead of trying to win support.68  “Despite all the press photos showing Soviet 
soldiers with Afghan adults and children, genuine fraternization between Soviets and Afghans 
was discouraged.  During field operations, the Soviets called in artillery and air strikes on 
villages without warning the inhabitants.”69  The Afghans did not resist the pervasiveness of the 
Soviet occupation, but how it was used.  This shows the U.S. foreign policy’s lack of 
understanding not only of history but also of the Afghan people—they were not against a large 
presence but how it was used and how it exacerbated the situation.  It is worth noting how 
instead of asking the Afghan people whether they would have preferred a large-scale or small-
scale occupation, U.S. foreign policy based itself on unwarranted assumptions such as the 
aforementioned.   
Although President George W. Bush and his administration decided that their purpose in 
Afghanistan was not for peacekeeping, some of their rhetoric indicates otherwise.  In his April 
17, 2002 address to the nation, President George W. Bush said that America’s purpose in 
Afghanistan goes beyond eliminating terrorism and resentment.  America’s purpose is also to 
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ensure opportunity for all Afghans by helping to rebuild their country.70  By utilizing 
contradictory rhetoric, the Bush administration caused frustration not only for Americans but 
also for Afghan citizens.71  Not only do President George W. Bush’s words contradict 
themselves but they also confuse how his administration defines success in Afghanistan.  A 
peacekeeping role requires a large foreign presence, yet the United States’ presence remains 
small.  Because of this, it seems as if the United States does not truly intend to have a significant 
peacekeeping role.      
Beginning in 2005, the Taliban’s presence became more palpable.  Afghan forces were 
unable to protect the Afghan people from the Taliban’s large forces.72  The fact that the Taliban 
took control over large areas demonstrated the need for increased security and police forces.  The 
United States’ allowance for the Taliban to take control shows the United States’ lack of 
practical concern for the people of Afghanistan, which contributes to Afghan resentment of U.S. 
troops.   
A need for security forces 
New York Times reporter David S. Rhode, who spent years in Afghanistan, says security 
improvements would solve Afghanistan’s problems.73  By looking at southern Afghanistan, he 
says, one can see how Karzai and the United States’ mistakes are due to lack of security forces:  
“The Karzai government has made major mistakes in southern Afghanistan that have really 
alienated the population and created an opening for the Taliban to move into southern 
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Afghanistan with a lot of popular support.”74 The Afghan people resist the United States 
occupation because of U.S. decisions.  Because of the lack of security southern Afghans receive, 
the Taliban is more accepted as a political leader in their region.  From the beginning, President 
Bush said the United States would help Afghanistan set up an Afghan military.  By seeing how 
southern Afghanistan’s situation has worsened because of a lack of security, one can see that 
President Bush’s promise is without backing or realization.  The Afghan public has not resented 
the U.S. occupation since 2001.  The Afghans’ resentment is correlated with the United States 
continued failed promises.  For this reason, one cannot conclude that the Afghan public is anti-
foreign.   
 In January 2006, Major General Robert Durbin was appointed to head the training of 
Afghan police and army.  Although he thought he could positively modify the police force within 
a few months, Durbin soon realized that it would take over ten years.75  Despite this realization, 
Major General Durbin was determined to continue efforts to reform the police force and his 
determination prodded the United States to increase attention and funding for the training 
Afghan police forces.  As this attention increased, the United States realized how corrupt and 
inexperienced the Afghan security force was. “Afghan, U.S., and European officials involved in 
police training reported pervasive corruption throughout the force.”76 This pervasive corruption 
supported the need to rebuild Afghanistan’s domestic security forces.   
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In a 2008 report, the Pentagon acknowledged that corruption and insufficient U.S. 
military trainers have inhibited Afghanistan’s police force.77  In response to violence being at an 
all-time high in March 2009, President Barack Obama deployed an additional four thousand U.S. 
troops with the sole purpose of training Afghan soldiers.   President Obama noted, “These 
additional troops will fully resource our effort to train and support the Afghan army and 
police.”78  Although this increase in troops is a prima facie accomplishment, the United States’ 
policy from September 2001 has been to build an Afghan military force.  Thus, one can question 
what the United States has been doing in the past 10 years to ameliorate security and end 
corruption, the promises the United States made to Afghanistan.   
 Despite the increase in troop numbers, some argue that sending more troops is not the 
answer to assisting Afghan forces.  Max Boot, a Jeane J. Kirkpatrick Senior Fellow for National 
Security Studies, considered that money is the answer.  In a 2006 Council on Foreign Relations 
article, contributor Max Boot contends, “U.S. financial assistance to Afghanistan has never been 
adequate.”79  Without this funding, continued problems with security forces will result.  This 
speaks to a potential issue of aid for the people of Afghanistan.  If security forces require more 
funding than received, how is Afghanistan supposed to improve its condition?  Not only is the 
lack of problem not fixing Afghanistan’s problems but some may argue that the problems are 
worse (by looking at the amount of corruption ever increasing in the country). 
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Although President Obama increased troop numbers to assist Afghanistan’s security, 
some Afghan leaders are against this surge.  In November 2010, President Hamid Karzai told 
The Washington Post, “The time has come to reduce military operations.  The time has come to 
reduce the presence of, you know, boots in Afghanistan . . . to reduce the intrusiveness into the 
daily Afghan life.”80  Without the complete support of President Karzai and his government, the 
United States’ increase in aid may be futile.  Because of this vacillation in support, U.S. success 
in Afghanistan remains difficult. 
The United States is not the only one concerned about the corruption and incompetence 
of Karzai’s government.  The Afghan public’s faith has decreased as corruption has increased.81 
According to The New York Times article “Bribes Corrode Afghans’ Trust in Government,” 
corruption is contributing to a lack of public confidence in Karzai’s government.82  It is agreed 
that corruption must be ended in order to improve the country but it remains debated how it 
should be handled.  Although the Afghan people’s faith in President Karzai has waned, Karzai 
and his people seem to agree on one thing:  the international presence is not facilitating growth.  
As the situation continues to appear futile, individuals conclude that it is because Afghans 
are ungovernable.  Because they are ungovernable, success in Afghanistan is unlikely.  “Because 
of the laziness and complicity within the mainstream media, the United States and its allies have 
been able to perpetuate the myth that Afghanistan has always been an ungovernable state.”83 
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Although it may be true that Afghans are ungovernable, this conclusion can only be reached after 
all other problems have been solved.  Until then, it remains uncertain if the lack of success is a 
result of Afghans being ungovernable or the United States’ policies.  
The war in Afghanistan is complicated and the United States’ policies seem to further this 
complication.  President George W. Bush’s conflicting rhetoric and with his conflicting policies 
have inhibited growth in Afghanistan.  By relying on the assumption that Afghans are anti-
foreign if aggravated, the United States has made their role more difficult and less obvious.  For 
this reason, it is important to understand that the Afghan public is not anti-foreign.  By 
comparing the rhetoric of the Afghan political elite and the Afghan public, it can be determined 
if that the Afghan people have not been anti-foreign.  Despite this, it remains a question to whom 
the United States should respond if one group is anti-foreign and the other is not.   
4.3 Comparing rhetoric of the Afghan political elite and Afghan public over time 
               By contrasting different time periods of the 20th and 21st century, one can conclude that 
the Afghan people’s tolerance of foreigners has been relatively consistent through the years. In 
this section, both the Afghan public and the Afghan political elite are the variables of study.  
Because of the language barrier, studying the changing sentiment of modern Afghans is a 
challenge.  Despite this challenge, there have been several foreigners (who speak Afghan 
languages such as Pashto) to Afghanistan.  In their memoirs, the Afghan public and political elite 
are also their variable of study.   
            Through their encounters, the reader has much to learn about the Afghan people, the 
Afghan government, and their different opinions of outsiders.  For this reason, I utilize the 
encounters of foreign travelers and the Afghan people to determine if the Afghan public is anti-
foreign.  For example, if Afghans were anti-foreign, would they repeatedly invite foreigners into 
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their home or conduct a conversation with them?  Throughout this section, I will show that 
encounters such as the aforementioned demonstrate that the Afghan people have not been anti-
foreign over time.  Although the Afghan people have not been anti-foreign over time, the Afghan 
government does show xenophobia through out the 20th and 21st century.  Although their opinion 
has differed with time, one can see that this anti-foreign view has really been that of 
Afghanistan’s government and not the public.   There are two significant reasons to utilize travel 
memoirs.  First, this source shows how foreigners portray the Afghan public.  This is important 
because many foreigners perceive Afghans are anti-foreign.  By seeing how outsiders think the 
Afghans portray anti-foreign views, one can see if their definitions of anti-foreign are valid.  The 
second reason to utilize travel memoirs is to see differences between in rhetoric between the 
Afghan public and Afghan political elite.  Because anti-foreign rhetoric differs between the 
public and government over time, the United States must decide to which sentiment to pay heed.  
For this reason, one must understand these differences.  By studying the Afghan public and 
political elite’s rhetoric over time, one can determine that it is the Afghan government and not 
the public that has mostly held an anti-foreign view.    
 The 1930s in Afghanistan 
            In 1933, Robert Byron began a journey through the Middle East.  Although his writings 
on Afghanistan are short, he quickly concludes how the Afghans expect Europeans to conform to 
their standards.84  This expectation, according to Byron, demonstrates the anti-foreign attitude 
held by the Afghans, but his description does not actually indicate xenophobia.  Byron later 
states the standard to which the Afghan people expect him to conform is the inability to buy 
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alcohol in the country.  He notes that there is not a drop of alcohol in the whole country.71  
Although Bryon traveled to Afghanistan in the 1930s, today it is expected that the traveler 
conforms to the host country’s standards—not the converse.  Because of this, this expectation is 
not only conventional but it also cannot be considered anti-foreign.  Although Byron is 
inconvenienced by this law, the Afghan people cannot be considered anti-foreign simply because 
they do not change it to accommodate a traveler.  
           When Byron tells a Punjabi traveler he meets that it is nice to be in a freer environment 
than Persia, the friend says, “You make a large mistake, sir, when you think there are no 
suspicions here.  It is all suspicions . . . At the present time, twenty foreigners reside in this town, 
Indians and Russians.  About one hundred and twenty government agents are employed to watch 
them.”71  This traveler goes on to state that the government is currently watching Byron and that 
it is the wrong time to be in Afghanistan.  This traveler’s remarks reflect more poorly on the 
Afghan government then the Afghan people—the government is hiring these agents in response 
to their own suspicions of foreigners.   Byron later relays a first-hand account with one of these 
agents.71   
The 1950s in Afghanistan 
In 1953, Eric Newby traveled through Afghanistan.   In A Short Walk through the Hindu 
Kush, he relays his encounters with the Afghans.  During his travels, Newby notes that the 
Afghanis say hurtful things about non-Muslims and there is an obvious distrust of foreigners.85  
However, as he continues to travel and observe this distrust, he is told that the Afghan 
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government is reluctant to allow travelers because not only are the inhabitants unpredictable in 
their reception of foreigners but also partly because potential visitors are suspected of being 
agents who would stir up trouble.86 Although Newby begins his memoir noting the Afghan 
public’s distrust of foreigners, it seems as if this distrust is strictly in response to the Afghan 
government’s anti-foreign attitude.  Because the political elite do not trust foreigners, they create 
restrictions on the interactions between the public and foreigners in order to suppress their own 
anxiety.   
By creating restrictions on travelers, it is possible that the Afghan people think they have 
reason to fear these outsiders.  If they should not fear them, then their government would not 
install restrictions on their relationships with travelers.  Therefore it seems that by installing 
these regulations, the Afghan government is also installing an anti-foreign sentiment in the 
Afghan people.  Despite this possibility, Eric Newby seems to describe more friendly encounters 
than negative.  
The restrictions which Newby discusses show that the Afghan government is anti-
foreign; however, one cannot conclude that the Afghan people are anti-foreign because of these 
restrictions.  These restrictions were created partially because the government was unsure how 
the public would respond to outsiders. They were also instituted because of the government’s 
distrust of outsiders.  This demonstrates that the Afghan government did not represent their 
public’s views but also did not attempt to understand how their view toward foreigners. It is 
possible that the government’s restrictions created a suspicion of outsiders in the Afghans.  
Afghans cannot be considered anti-foreign if their “obvious distrust of foreigners” is result of the 
Afghan government’s own fears.   
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Soviet Occupation in Afghanistan (1979-1988) 
In Debra Denker’s Sisters on the Bridge of Fire, a travel log written approximately 20 
years after Eric Newby’s memoir, it remains as if it is the Afghan political elite creating these 
anti-foreign views.  Denker quotes several encounters she has with Afghans showing how they 
would love to invite her into their home, but the government restricts the public from hosting 
foreigners.87  This demonstrates that the Afghans’ reason for not inviting Denker into their home 
is not because they hold an anti-foreign attitude, but because of their government’s restrictions.  
Because the government fears outsiders, they install restrictions on the public’s interaction with 
them.    
Although many of her new Afghan friends are nervous to be seen in public with a 
foreigner, many Afghans still invite Denker into their home.  This reinforces the belief that the 
Afghan people are not anti-foreign but are simply scared of the possible repercussions from 
inviting foreigners into their home.  While their government prevents them from demonstrating 
their tolerance of foreigners in public, the Afghan people acknowledge behind closed doors their 
acceptance of foreigners.  In fact, Denker does not only show the Afghans being accepting of 
foreigners but she also shows them going out of their way for her.  “Hospitality is a matter of 
sacred honor to all Afghans.  Traditionally in a village, women would eat separately, but because 
I am a foreign journalist who wants to tell their story, my companions break many traditions for 
me.”73  Because Denker is a foreigner, Afghans invite her into their home.  This not only 
demonstrates a lack of an anti-foreign view but also an almost pro-foreign attitude.  By inviting 
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Denker into their home because she is a foreigner, the Afghan people prove their acceptance of 
foreigners.  
Not only does Denker show how Afghans rid tradition in order to accommodate a 
foreigner but she also continues to show how the government’s curfew and restrictions have 
detrimental effects on the people.  “Everyone is afraid to admit friendship with a foreigner.”73  
This shows xenophobia being created by the Afghan government—by restricting Afghans from 
interacting with outsiders, a fear of being seen with foreigners is instilled in the Afghan people.  
It is important to note that it is not a fear of foreigners the government instills, but the fear of 
being seen with them.   
Although they are afraid to admit friendship, they are still friends with foreigners.  
Throughout Denker’s travels, she continues to meet caring Afghans who invite her into their 
home.  Not only is Denker a foreigner but she is also a woman.  This makes her encounters with 
Afghan men even more surprising.  By sleeping in the same room as these men, one sees devote 
Muslims contradicting their traditions in order to accommodate not only a complete stranger 
woman, and outsider.   
Despite her friendly encounters with the Afghan people, she notes that while “they will 
accept war, suffering, loss of home and family, and personal death, which they see as martyrdom 
guaranteeing paradise, they won’t accept foreign domination of their country.”88  This does not 
mean that the Afghan people are anti-foreign.  This instead signifies that the Afghan public has 
been against domination.  This is a key point because it relates back to the 2001 United States 
invasion.  Many Afghans originally welcomed United States involvement because they did not 
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perceive it as the U.S. trying to take over.   This is understandable.  Although the United States 
and Great Britain are allies, Great Britain would not allow the United States to rule their 
country—this does not make the United States xenophobic of Great Britain.  The Afghan 
people’s resistance to foreign domination is not in itself an anti-foreign act.  
It is important to note that Denker’s travels in Afghanistan were taking place from the 
start of the Soviet occupation in 1979 to 1984.  It may be that after the Soviets had been in 
Afghanistan for some time that a fear of foreigners developed, not out of fear of the government 
restrictions, but because of the Soviets.  In Thomas Barfield’s A Cultural and Political History he 
argues that Russian intervention mobilized more opposition to foreigners89; however, Debra 
Denker’s interactions take place during this intervention.  It is hard to imagine the Afghan people 
being more accepting of Denker; according to Barfield, however, the Afghan people were more 
anti-foreign at the time of her travels than in the past.  Although Barfield argues that the Russian 
intervention mobilized more opposition to foreigners, did this intervention mobilize more 
opposition to all foreigners or just the Soviets?   By looking at Debra Denker’s memoir, one can 
argue that the Soviet intervention mobilized opposition to Soviets, not of foreigners (Denker is 
from the United States) in general.  
The Soviet invasion is a crucial time period for understanding Afghanis and their possible 
reasons for supposed xenophobia.  The nine-year occupation left Afghans worse off than before 
the invasion—they were devastated and exhausted from resisting the Soviets.  Thomas Barfield 
says that the Soviet invasion mobilized opposition to foreigners.  In contrast, in his memoir, 
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Guibert Lefevre notes only positive encounters with the Afghan people.90   In The Photographer: 
Into War-Torn Afghanistan with Doctors Without Borders, Guibert Lefevre tells many stories 
exemplifying Afghani generosity.  During his travels, Lefevre met a man named Robert who 
started out as a traveler in Afghanistan, but after constantly witnessing Afghan generosity, 
moved to the country.  The experience that made Robert stay in Afghanistan was when the 
village he was staying in ran out of bread supplies, yet continued to give him bread.76  It seems 
that the Afghans would not give a foreigner the last of their bread if they were anti-foreign.  
During the Soviet occupation, Guibert Lefevre (a French doctor) traveled to Afghanistan.  
Because the Soviet invasion has left many of them injured and unable to rehabilitate themselves, 
the Afghans need outside assistance.  In his writings, it seems as if the Afghanis do not care who 
helps them—they simply want help.  This further supports the anti-domination theory.  The 
Afghans want help.  This is made clear through Lefevre’s The Photographer and is made clearer 
today.   
The 1990s 
 Throughout Malalai Joya’s book Woman Among the Warlords, she says that she is 
speaking on behalf of the Afghan people—she is their representative.  Despite her claim, there is 
a disconnect for the reader:  we are not sure if she is really representing the Afghan people.  Joya 
makes her anti-American attitude known throughout her writings.  While it is true that a 
representative may have some views that her people do not share, by continuously saying she 
represents the people and is also anti-foreign, it seems as if she wants to argue that this is a view 
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from the people.  It remains a question if Joya really does represent the Afghan public’s 
sentiment.  
While she is anti-American, Joya also recognizes her country’s dependency on foreign 
help.  So while she considers that foreigners are the root of her problems, they seem to also be 
the solution.  Although Joya attempts to represent the Afghan public in her book, the reader must 
consider her as the political elite she is.  Because of this, her anti-foreign view is considered a 
view of the Afghan political elite.  
In the 1990s, the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan.  Many, including Thomas 
Barfield, document the Taliban movement and their dearth of popularity in the region.  In a 
sense, the Afghan people were anti-foreign by rejecting the Taliban.  The Taliban is a product of 
Pakistan and the Taliban’s leader had little understanding of Afghanistan and its history.  There 
is reason to suspect that an anti-foreign view came from this; however, although the Afghan 
people rejected a foreign group (the Taliban), this rejection does not reflect on foreigners in 
general.  Because the Taliban caused and continues to cause the Afghan people much harm, the 
Afghan people resent them.  When the Afghan people resent foreigners, it seems as if it is not 
necessarily because they are foreigners but it is because it is a justified response to the actual 
harm the foreigner has caused them.   
 The Afghan people resisted the Taliban regime (1996-2001) of their country.  While it is 
important to realize that the Taliban’s opinion of outsiders differed from that of the public, it is 
also important to realize that, to outsiders, the Taliban opinion was the opinion of Afghanistan. 
The Afghan public’s opinion was hardly discussed or known to the outside world and, therefore, 
foreign perception of the Taliban is important.  The reason it is important is because what the 
West perceived of the Taliban, they most likely perceived of the public.  During the Taliban rule, 
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the Afghan public did not have a voice.  Because of this, the Taliban, the Afghan political elite’s 
opinion was accepted as the opinion of the nation.  Although the Taliban requested aid from the 
United Nations, they also demonstrated “hostile rhetoric and regular threats to throw the 
international agencies out of the country.”91  The Taliban demonstrated hostility toward the 
international community through their rhetoric and actions.  This hostility was taken as the 
opinion of the nation as only one voice was portrayed throughout their rule.   
2001-present 
In 2002 Rory Stewart walks across Afghanistan.  In The Places in Between, he 
documents his travels.  Although he states no particular reason for this journey, much is learned 
about Afghanistan and its people.  Throughout his travels he is dependent on the hospitality of 
Afghans.  “Tell them I am a guest, a traveler. Muslims cannot refuse hospitality.”92  This is his 
attitude throughout his memoir.  He is demanding when it comes to ensuring that he receives this 
hospitality.  Despite his demands, he is almost always accepted as a guest.  If it is required by 
Islam to be hospitable and because Islam is an all-encompassing way of life for them, it would 
seem that Afghans would not be anti-foreign.93  Regardless of this possibility, it still remains 
unresolved whether Afghans are anti-foreign.   
When denied a place to stay, Stewart’s Afghan guide was ashamed.  He told the host: 
“Look at this man.  This man is a foreigner.  Look how disgustingly you have behaved toward 
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him.”94 Stewart shows how the Afghans are expected to accommodate foreigners because they 
are foreign.  Although Stewart’s memoir was written more than twenty years after Debra 
Denker’s memoir was written, there are parallels.  In Denker’s book she writes that the Afghans 
invite her in because she is foreign.  In Stewart’s book, he shows Afghans being expected to 
invite foreigners into their home simply because they are foreigners.  Because of this, one can 
see that there are similarities in the way Afghans treat foreigners despite the difference in time.   
As Rory Stewart travels through Afghanistan, he interacts with the members from several 
different ethnic tribes of Afghanistan.  One of these Afghans is a member of the Tajik who told 
him “foreigners should stay out [of our country].”79 Stewart replied by saying that he has been 
treated very well in other Muslim countries because Muslims treat guests well.   After he says 
this, the Tajiks change their behavior by saying, “of course we treat guests well. We are 
Muslims.”79  This was one of the few anti-foreign encounters Rory Stewart had in his walk 
across Afghanistan.  Although he did not have many anti-foreign encounters, he did encounter 
some people who were not welcoming.79   
Throughout his book, he compares his experience in Afghanistan with those in other 
Muslim countries—while residents of Iran and Pakistan would not let him travel alone, not many 
offered to escort Rory to other villages in Afghanistan.  Despite this aforementioned statement, it 
seems as if he is seldom alone throughout his travels.   
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Haji Mohsin, a feudal commander and a man of the utmost importance in his village, 
offered Rory a place to stay for the night.  Despite this hospitality, Rory was forced to deal with 
anti-foreign sentiment.  “Twenty-five years getting rid of the foreigners and here they are again,” 
said Haji Mohsin’s younger brother.95  No one would argue against this statement being anti-
foreign but the way in which Rory shows how it was said makes it seem as if it were just a bad 
joke.  This makes for confusion because while these Afghans are making xenophobic statements, 
they are simultaneously offering a foreigner a place to sleep.   
  In a 2009 article, The Washington Post stated, “The planned U.S. military and 
counterinsurgency drive in Afghanistan is meeting public and official resistance that could delay 
and possibly undermine a costly, belated effort that American officials here acknowledge has a 
limited window of time to succeed.”96  It is important to note that the aforementioned quote 
divides Afghans into two groups:  the public and officials.  Although this article argues that both 
groups are resenting the United States counterinsurgency, it remains a question if either group is 
anti-foreign.  It would be much easier for the United States to respond if both the Afghan 
political elite and public held the same opinion of foreigners; however, the Afghan public and 
government’s opinions have differed about foreigners over time.  Because of this, it remains a 
question to which rhetoric the United States should respond. 
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President Hamid Karzai’s April 3, 2010 Speech 
            In Thomas Barfield’s Afghanistan, he quotes a veteran Western diplomat saying, “Karzai 
was seen by many Afghans as a puppet of the Americans. It delegitimized him.”97 By not 
wanting Karzai to be a puppet of the Americans, one may argue that the Afghan public 
demonstrates their anti-Americanism; however, if someone does not want their government to be 
a puppet of another country, one cannot conclude that they are anti-foreign.  Calling President 
Karzai a puppet of the Americans, the Afghan people argue that he not only is dependent on the 
United States but he also responds to U.S. requests instead of Afghan desires (Joya 107).  If it is 
true that President Karzai is a “puppet of the Americans,” one may argue that he is pro-
American, yet his April 2010 speech tells us differently on his thoughts of Americans and the 
international community.  
              On April 3, 2010, it is reported that President Hamid Karzai told a meeting of 
parliamentary deputies, “if the international community pressures me more, I swear that I am 
going to join the Taliban.”68  Although many argue that President Karzai needs the United States 
and the rest of the international community, his April 2010 speech is referred to as a “harsh anti-
Western speech in which he accused foreigners of manipulating last year’s election and warned 
that America and NATO troops risked being seen as invaders.”98  This accusation was troubling 
for the United States.  Although the President Barack Obama’s administration was seeking 
clarification from President Karzai in regard to his remarks, President Karzai’s message is clear: 
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he wants foreigners to leave Afghanistan.99   There are reasons for President Karzai to criticize 
the United States.  For example, the Afghan public thinks he depends too heavily on the United 
States.  It may be that he criticizes the United States in order to prove otherwise to the Afghan 
people.   
              In his speech, Karzai warns foreigners that they will soon be seen as invaders.100  This is 
important:  because he believes the international community has overstayed its welcome, they 
will be considered invaders if they stay.  When Secretary of State Hilary Clinton asked for an 
explanation, President Karzai said that he was criticizing western news coverage and not the 
United States68; however, he addresses more than the western media in his speech.  “Foreigners 
will make excuses, they do not want us to have a parliamentary election.  They want parliament 
to be weakened and battered, and for me to be an ineffective president and for parliament to be 
ineffective.”60  Although some of President Karzai’s actions (i.e. responding to U.S. requests and 
not those of the Afghans) tell us differently about his tolerance of foreigners, his speech’s 
message is clearly anti-foreign.  The aforementioned quotes are all taken from one of Karzai’s 
speech.  Despite it being a singular event, his rhetoric is reflected in Afghanistan’s parliament.   
The parliament of Afghanistan 
                Malalai Joya is one of these parliament members in which the rhetoric from Karzai’s 
April 2010 speech is reflected.  In Woman Among Warlords the United States offers Joya 
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assistance and she turns it down saying that the help should be from Afghans.101  This is just one 
of the many instances in which Joya shows her anti-American sentiment.  Despite her constant 
anti-foreign rhetoric, she also argues, “If Afghanistan is to stand on its own feet as a democratic 
and independent country, it will require the participation of many who today live in the West.”102  
This leads to confusion:  Joya continuously portrays her anti-foreign attitude yet simultaneously 
says the Afghans need their help.  Despite her contradictory rhetoric, it seems as if her 
intolerance of foreigners may be warranted.  She states that the CIA paid many warlords for their 
support of the U.S. war.  Because of this funding, warlords are able to buy their parliament 
seats.70  Allowing warlords to be involved in Afghanistan’s reform, the United States has created 
enemies such as Joya.  “The people of Afghanistan would never forgive the United States for 
backing such brutal men.”70  Although Joya speaks on behalf of the Afghan people, the reader 
cannot be certain that her rhetoric accurately reflects their thoughts.  Despite this, the reader 
easily ascertains that Malalai Joya, an Afghan political elite, is anti-foreign.  
             “The Afghan political class is proving loath to follow the West’s script.”103  One 
example of this is that parliament has turned down 17 of President Karzai’s ministerial 
nominees.  The United States had certain specific nominees in mind for the aforementioned 
positions; however, the parliament has refused their wishes by not electing them.   
             It is difficult to determine what entails an anti-foreign view and what does not; however, 
it seems as if the government portrays an anti-foreign view often through out the 20th and 21st 
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century.  While both the Afghan government and public resent the American occupation at times, 
the Afghan public remains tolerant of foreigners (as demonstrated in Rory Stewart’s The Places 
in Between).  The anti-American backlash is due to the United States’ failed promises and the 
suffering Afghanistan experiences because of these failures.  Despite this resentment and anti-
domination attitude expressed among the Afghan people, the Afghan people have not been anti-
foreign.   
5. Some Conclusions 
  
 The aforementioned writings demonstrate that the Afghan public has not been anti-
foreign.  Throughout each memoir, Afghan individuals are inviting and kind to outsiders.  When 
the public at first seems suspicious of outsiders, the reader learns that it is usually a result of the 
Afghan government’s anti-foreign view.  The government creates restrictions on the Afghan 
public’s interactions with outsiders and makes the public hesitant to interact with foreigners.  
Despite this hesitancy, the Afghan public continues to invite outsiders into their homes.   
 In 2001, the Afghan public invited the United States into their home country.  In Thomas 
Barfield’s Afghanistan he states, “there was a surprising level of popular support within 
Afghanistan for the U.S. intervention.”104  Although the U.S. already had the public’s support, 
the U.S. focused their policy on gaining the Afghan public’s support.  The United States will 
only defeat the Taliban and al Qaeda by first winning the Afghan people’s hearts and minds.105  
In the documentary Restrepo the significance of having the Afghan public on their side is 
obvious.  When U.S. troops accidentally kill local civilians, the soldiers appear frustrated and 
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angry.  These accidental deaths do not help the U.S. mission to capture the Taliban.106  In fact, 
these deaths hinder and impede the United States’ ability to capture Taliban forces.  When 
interviewed in this documentary, the soldiers stress that in order to push forward to capture the 
Taliban, the Afghan people must be on their side.   If the Afghan public is anti-foreign, the 
United States’ mission would be futile in the region; however, the public is not xenophobic.  
Because of this, the United States has reason to gain the Afghan public’s support.  
  On March 27, 2011 Rolling Stone released an article detailing how U.S. soldiers, for their 
own recreational purposes, have murdered innocent Afghan civilians.  Although the soldiers’ 
officers failed to stop them, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen stresses 
how these actions go against the United States’ mission in Afghanistan: “If we’re killing local 
civilians, we’re going to strategically lose.”107  Despite military officials recognizing the need to 
have the Afghan civilians on the U.S. side, some soldiers did not.  Soldiers Jeremy Morlock and 
Andrew Holmes constantly had conversations of killing one of these innocent “savages” for 
fun.108  Finally these soldiers decided to act on these countless imaginings.  United States 
soldiers Morlock and Holmes fired repeatedly at short range on an innocent, 15-year-old Afghan 
boy.  They celebrated their kill by taking photographs with the dead youth and cutting off his 
little finger to serve as a trophy.109  Although these actions do not represent most U.S. soldiers, 
they reflect poorly on the United States occupation.  President Hamid Karzai of Afghanistan 
recognizes that these incidents were exceptional cases; however, these tragedies explain why the 
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United States meets resistance with local civilians.110   By committing these crimes, the United 
States continues to give reason for the Afghan public to resist the U.S. occupation.   
 In Malalai Joya’s A Woman Among Warlords she recognizes that Afghanistan needs 
international help in order to ameliorate their situation.111  The Afghan people also recognize that 
the United States is not helping their country.  As more innocent civilians are murdered (whether 
by accident or not), U.S. troops will continue to meet resistance.  One cannot generalize from 
this resistance that the Afghan people are being anti-foreign.  In fact, this heavy assumption has 
short-changed Afghans in the process.  They are suffering largely because of the false 
assumptions the United States makes.  In Thomas Barfield’s book he states how the Afghan 
people noticed a difference between the U.S. invasion and that of the Soviets and British:  “there 
were practically no Americans to be seen during the war against the Taliban.”112  The Afghan 
people allowed the U.S. into their home.  Despite this allowance, the United States formed a light 
footprint policy in order to preclude an anti-foreign backlash.  By doing this, the United States 
ignored the obvious evidence of the Afghan people not being anti-foreign.   
To win the end game in this lengthy and important chess match, the current strategy must 
be reconsidered, and remaining assets redeployed in an effort to secure the hearts and minds of 
the Afghan populace.  Only then will the war end in checkmate with a win for the United States 
and the Afghan people.  The Afghan people have not been anti-foreign and the United States 
must drastically alter their policies to this finding.     
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